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Recent literature has shed light on the economic potential of cross-border networks. These net-
works, consisting of expatriates and their acquaintances from abroad and at home, provide the ba-
sis for the creation of cross-border value added chains and therewith the means for turning brain 
drain into brain circulation. Both aspects are potentially valuable for economic growth in the devel-
oping world. Unilateral co-development policies operating through co-funding of expatriate business 
ventures, but also bilateral agreements liberalising circular migration for a limited set of persons 
testify to the increasing awareness of governments about the potential, which expatriate networks 
hold for economic growth in developing countries. Whereas such punctual efforts are valuable, 
viewed from a long term perspective, these top-down, government mandated Diaspora stimulation 
programs, will not replace, this paper argues, the market-driven liberalisation of infrastructure and 
other services in developing countries. Nor will they carry, in the case of circular labour migration, 
the political momentum to liberalise labour market admission for those non-nationals, who will even-
tually emerge as the future transnational entrepreneurs. It will take a combination of mode 4 and 
infrastructure services openings-cum regulation for countries at both sides of the spectrum to pro-
vide the basis and pre-condition for transnational business and entrepreneurial networks to emerge 
and translate into cross-border, value added production chains.  
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Two key issues are of particular relevance in this context: (i) the services sector, especially in infra-
structure, tends to suffer from inefficiencies, particularly in developing countries, and (ii) labour mi-
gration, a highly complex issue, still faces disproportionately rigid barriers despite well-documented 
global welfare gains. Both are hindrances for emerging markets to fully take advantage of the poten-
tial of these cross-border networks. Adapting the legal framework for enhancing the regulatory and 
institutional frameworks for services trade, especially in infrastructure services sectors (ISS) and 
labour migration could provide the incentives necessary for brain circulation and strengthen cross-
border value added chains by lowering transaction costs.  
 
This paper analyses the shortfalls of the global legal framework – the shallow status quo of GATS 
commitments in ISS and mode 4 particular – in relation to stimulating brain circulation and the crea-
tion of cross-border value added chains in emerging markets. It highlights the necessity of adapting 
the legal framework, both on the global and the regional level, to stimulate broader and wider market 
access in the four key ISS sectors (telecommunications, transport, professional and financial ser-
vices) in developing countries, as domestic supply capacity, global competitiveness and economic 
diversification in ISS sectors are necessary for mobilising expatriate returns, both physical and vir-
tual. The paper argues that industrialised, labour receiving countries need to offer mode 4 market 
access to wider categories of persons, especially to students, graduate trainees and young profes-
sionals from abroad. Furthermore, free trade in semi-finished products and mode 4 market access 
are crucial for the creation of cross-border value added chains across the developing world. Finally, 
the paper discusses on the basis of a case study on Jordan why the key features of trade agree-
ments, which promote circular migration and the creation of cross-border value added chains, con-
sist of trade liberalisation in services and liberal migration policies.  
 
1. Introduction 
Recent research has shed light on the positive effect on economic growth when young 
people, who study abroad, return to their home countries and use their network and 
know-how from abroad for the creation of regional value added chains (e.g. Saxenian 
2001, Beine et al. 2003, Lowell 2001). The same holds true of non-formally trained 
workers, whose human and entrepreneurial capital is enhanced by their stay abroad 
(Piperno and Stocchiero 2006, Guarneri 2005) to the effect that these migrant workers 
become catalyst of transnational investment activities. Even without a physical return, 
expatriate networks have an indirect, more virtual ‘return’ effect, when, as Leblang 
(2009) described, the migrants abroad lower information costs and asymmetries for 
potential investors to the expatriate’s home country. If successful, such expatriate en-
trepreneurial networks create employment opportunities, provide access to capital and 
intensify the participation of that country in cross-border trade and investment.  
 
This effect is of particular interest for emerging markets otherwise lacking access to 
technology and capital, which are two key production factors underrepresented in 
emerging markets. More and more young people from emerging markets attain their 
postgraduate degrees from an internationally high-ranked university, preferably in a 
developed country. According to the ‘brain drain’ theory, these students tend to stay in 
the West to take advantage of their know-how and newly formed networks, which 
damages the economy of their home countries (Beine et al. 2003:2). If they decide to 
return home, however, their network and know-how are also of value for exploiting 
business opportunities: they will be of particular value in starting cross-border busi-
ness ventures (Ibid.:5). The advancing of such cross-border business ideas stimulates 
the economy of the home country as well as of other countries in the region. Further-
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more, it encourages ‘brain circulation’ and therewith helps to prevent the negative ef-
fects of brain drain.  
 
As Rauch and Trindade (2002) have shown, expatriate migrant networks not only en-
gage in entrepreneurship directly and thus contribute to employment creation in their 
countries of origin, but also play an important ‘informational’ role in encouraging for-
eign direct investment to their countries of origin. Drawing on this finding, Leblang 
(2009) empirically documents the findings by Saxenian (2001) and others that tertiary 
educated migrants, who themselves are involved in the investment process, will in-
crease both portfolio and foreign direct investment, while less educated migrant net-
works will stimulate only the latter.  
 
Governments have only recently started attempts to operationalise and aggrandise the 
scope and functioning of private-based initiatives and networks so as to stimulate 
broader employment creation. Tools used include tax incentives, reduction of remit-
tances transfer costs, establishment of circular migration programmes for scientific, 
technical Diasporas and businessmen, as well as joint university chairs. Such govern-
ment-led programmes will, however, not substitute for broader-based liberalisation of 
key services sectors and modes of supply, namely the cross-border, temporary move-
ment of persons. Thus, the role and architecture of trade agreements is essential in the 
process of channelling and utilising expatriate networks information and know how. 
 
The availability and quality of services is another key factor for the success of cross-
border business networks (Langhammer 2006:4). For example, transportation, com-
munication and finance are vitally important determinants of the success of business 
ideas involving cross-border networks. Any cross-border value added chain is inher-
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ently linked with these services, as they are required for co-ordinating the various lo-
cations involved in adding value to the end-product, or facilitate doing so. As opposed 
to the trade in goods, liberalising trade in services is not yet very advanced on a num-
ber of fronts despite it being generally agreed that liberalisation in the services sector 
would improve access to higher-quality services at more attractive prices, particularly 
in emerging markets (cf. Whalley 2003:50-1, Adlung 2007, cf. Theory of transaction 
costs). While the manufacture of goods in cross-border production chains has become 
a reality of the 21st century, their full potential cannot yet be tapped because service 
markets remain fragmented along national borders (cf. Australian Government 2004).  
 
This paper takes a closer look at the role of the services sector, especially the infra-
structure services sectors (ISS), which is key to attracting investments and physical 
return of expatriates (UNCTAD 2010a). Only a policy mix, consisting of liberalising 
ISS in developing countries while broadening the categories of persons whose tempo-
rary movement is being liberalised (mode 4) to students and graduate trainees, will 
foster the creation and evolution of cross-border value added chains. It discusses the 
impact of such value added chains on economic growth in emerging markets and es-
tablishes an argument for the regional liberalisation of services beyond the current 
status of GATS commitments and regulatory disciplines and institutional frameworks. 
Finally, this paper presents the outline of a legal framework for liberalising trade in 
services in a manner conducive to the creation of cross-border value added chains. 
This framework is discussed in a case study of Jordan, but draws on evidence from the 
policy models of Taiwan and China, as well as attempts made by France and Senegal 
to bolster brain circulation, mobilise expatriate returns and support the establishment 
of cross-border entrepreneurial ventures. 
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2. Cross-Border Value Added Chains, Transnational Business Net-
works and Economic Growth 
While it is disputed to what extent emerging markets economically suffer from brain 
drain (Beine et al. 2008, Docquier 2006), it is generally agreed that expatriates from 
emerging markets, both the technical and scientific Diaspora but also non-formally 
trained migrant workers doted with entrepreneurial skills, represent a valuable – and 
largely untapped – potential for the development of their home countries (cf. Meyer 
2001). During their stay abroad, expatriates build valuable networks with local busi-
nesses, industry associations, but also with decision-makers. An example in point are 
the Senegalese and Ghanaian seasonal agricultural workers in Northern Italian towns 
such as Modena, whose contacts with their employers and the local authorities led to 
the commercial establishment by their Italian employers of subsidiaries in Senegal 
region of Matam with the support of both the Italian local government and the Sene-
galese Ministry of Entrepreneurship (Piperno and Stocchiero 2006, Panizzon 2008).  
 
When returning home, expatriates tend to bring scarce know how and networks back 
to their home countries, thereby improving linkages with markets abroad and poten-
tially coming up with new business ideas: by returning home, foreign-educated people 
export first-hand knowledge to peripheral regions. This enables emerging markets to 
take part in the globalisation of the world market, and to put their respective competi-
tive advantages to use by integrating in cross-border value added chains. Cross-
regional entrepreneurs and their communities can facilitate the diffusion of technical 
and institutional know-how, provide access to potential customers and partners, and 
help overcome isolated economies’ reputational and informational barriers (Saxenian 
2006:104). 
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Among the main reasons for expatriates to stay in their host countries are the expecta-
tions to find better employment and business opportunities there (cf. Meyer 2001, 
Henderson 2002). Thus, a higher number of promising business opportunities at home 
and an improved ability to monetise them are expected to correlate positively with 
brain circulation and negatively with brain drain. While a number of issues restricting 
the occurrence and accessibility of business opportunities in developing countries and 
emerging markets, such as political instability and weak infrastructure, may only be 
cured through long-term structural reforms, improving the access to global markets 
and facilitating the creation of cross-border value-added chains may prove less tedious 
and faster to realise (Henderson 2002:55-6). According to economic theory, creating a 
more competitive environment through domestic deregulation and the liberalisation of 
international trade will tend to facilitate exploiting local competitive advantages and 
improve the development prospects for emerging markets in a globalised world (cf. 
Porter 1998, Devarajan and Rodrik 1989). 
 
Among other effects, enhancing competition in developing countries and emerging 
markets is expected to facilitate the integration of returnees, but also the Diaspora in 
cross-border value added chains (Saxenian 2005:36). The concept of value added 
chains is particularly relevant in this context, as it illustrates how most goods and ser-
vices are manufactured, assembled and marketed in today’s globalised economy. 
Value added chains can be defined as:  
[…] a full range of activities which are required to bring a product or service 
from conception, through the intermediary phases of production (involving a 
combination of physical transformation and the input of various producer ser-
vices), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use (Kaplinsky 
2000:8). 
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The increasing dynamism, competitiveness and geographical spread of global product 
markets have tended to dismember vertically integrated companies. Those trends have 
favoured decentralised production networks with various governance structures, but 
mostly consisting of numerous independent suppliers, service provides, assembly cen-
tres and marketing specialists (Sturgeon 2000). 
 
In cross-border value added chains, each step or component of the process is located in 
the place offering the highest specific competitive advantage. Depending on the posi-
tioning of the end product on the world market, the selection of locations will typically 
take into account cost advantages, the availability of relevant know-how, or a combi-
nation of the two (Henderson et al. 2002:443). With their global networks and knowl-
edge of other countries, foreign-educated expatriates returning to their home country 
to become entrepreneurs have an inherent advantage in finding the most competitive 
place for each step of the production process (cf. Lowell 2001:22) and are key facilita-
tors of mode 1 and mode 3 cross-border services flows. 
 
Technological progress and innovation in the services sector have rendered this decen-
tralised mode of production economically viable in the first place and expatriate re-
turns and brain circulation tend to increase the efficiency of such production. The 
global spread of telecommunication, transportation and other supporting services has 
drastically reduced the cost of sharing natural and human resources, as well as goods 
and services of any kind across the world. With technological progress, expatriates no 
longer need to physically return home to contribute to the home country development. 
Development-at-a-distance through mode 1 or mode 3 services supplies is a resource 
being increasingly tapped by host country development agencies and home country 
governments alike.  
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Governments have increasingly become aware of the expatriate potential as a devel-
opment factor and have started experimenting with policies to assist, support and for-
malise Diaspora-led home country development, both in the context of immigration 
laws and bilateral migration agreements. This type of government-led, ‘institutional’ 
approaches to mobilising expatriate resources and enhancing their developmental 
dividends, such as remittance transfer cost reduction programmes, were coined by 
Martin and Abella (2009:432) as the ‘easiest’ transmission mechanism between migra-
tion and development that a host country can encourage. The French Agency for De-
velopment’s online free comparison tool1 for remittance transfer fees is a typical ex-
ample. However, such ‘institutional’ approaches tend to be costly and to rely on do-
mestic taxpayers, which inherently limits their scope.  
 
Policy initiatives engaging the personal responsibility of the individual expatriate and 
mobilising private capital are more promising in terms of assuring the longevity and 
sustainability of entrepreneurial projects. For example, France’s new co-development 
tax reduction programme for foreigners from developing countries in lawful stays in 
France, who invest in infrastructure projects of their home countries identified as sus-
tainable by France, is a more innovative type of a government-led top-down policy 
initiative (Terrot 2009:19).  
 
This paper will focus on the difficulty to create the pre-conditions, which need to be 
put in place for such bottom-up transnational networks to emerge in the first place. It 
finds that these challenges lay in the manifold barriers to cross-border trade in infra-
structure services and labour migration. Cultural barriers, domestic worker coalitions 
and other ethnocentric forces pressing against the inflows of students, trainees and 
                                                 
1 Agence Française de développement, International money transfers: free comparative platform now 
online, 19 November 2007: http://www.envoidargent.fr/. 
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workers from abroad are more difficult to be overcome than it is for governments to 
establish stimulation packages, such as on remittances transfers or tax reductions. 
However, such stimuli are but punctual efforts under the label of ‘development aid’, 
limited both in duration and in terms of eligibility of categories of expatriate nationals.  
 
As posited by Saxenian (2006:104), a shared social context and language, which avert 
misunderstandings among partners, is vital for the success of long-distance collabora-
tions in rapidly evolving markets. Therefore, despite the reduction of physical dis-
tances through new technologies and more open global markets, regions sharing a 
similar culture or common languages are most able to co-operate in cross-border value 
added chains:  
The rise of entrepreneurship-led growth suggests that the regional cluster may 
be replacing the national economy as the locus of economic growth (Saxenian 
2006:108). 
 
We also argue that transnational entrepreneurial networks are more efficient than mul-
tinational corporations in transferring to emerging markets the skills and know-how 
that they need for their economic development (cf. The experience of ASEAN, Dean 
and Wagnaraja 2007). The intricacy and complexity of trade in the globalisation era 
requires sophisticated forms of coordination, not merely with respect to logistics, but 
also in relation to the integration of components into the design of the final products 
and the quality standards with which this integration is achieved. Through their decen-
tralised and demand-driven nature, cross-border value chains offer such sophisticated 
forms of coordination and integration (Kaplinsky 2000:12). They are also more flexi-
ble than multinational corporations and can link different business cultures and envi-
ronments, thus facilitating the dispersion of know-how to emerging markets (Saxenian 
2001:4).  
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Traditionally, development has been seen as building on the success of advanced 
economies, while peripheral regions remain followers. This view leaves little scope for 
the periphery to develop independent technological capabilities (Saxenian 2006:102): 
[Recent] changes in the world economy have undermined this core-periphery 
model. The increasing mobility of high-skilled workers and information, 
combined with the fragmentation of production in the information and tech-
nology sectors, provide unprecedented opportunities for formerly peripheral 
economies to benefit from decentralised growth based on entrepreneurship 
and experimentation (Saxenian 2006:103). 
The new possibilities based on technical progress, and on tapping the knowledge and 
skills of returning expatriates, thus, offer a new and more independent way of eco-
nomic development for emerging markets. 
 
Because cross-border entrepreneurship is a relatively new phenomenon in most emerg-
ing markets, systemic data on the impact of the ‘new argonauts’ on economic growth 
is still very scarce. Nevertheless, ‘their impacts are arguably as important as more eas-
ily measured multinational investments’ (Saxenian 2006:101).  
 
This section has shown that for emerging markets to take advantage of this new mode 
of economic development, it is crucial that expatriates have sufficiently bright busi-
ness prospects in their home country to lure them home. Theory suggests that ‘expatri-
ates have mainly left because they did not have enough supportive networks (institu-
tional, infra-structural, technical, educational, social, financial, aso.) to build, develop, 
express, use and to cash on their skills, at home’. They remain abroad, because they 
are precisely inserted into such supportive networks in their host countries: surveys 
have shown that the main reasons for expatriate entrepreneurs from emerging market 
to stay abroad are not linked to remuneration expectations, but rather to the availability 
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of technical or support staff providing the specialised services required to successfully 
operate a business (Meyer 2001:9). The following section will take a closer look at 
how this link between services and the ability of emerging markets to integrate in 
cross-border value added chains. 
 
 
3. Services as Catalysts for Cross-Border Value Added Chains 
Until recently, studies of value added chains have tended to neglect services while 
focussing on the aspects related to goods and labour:  
The role of services in global commodity chains has been ignored for a long 
time. Also, they are often treated as constituting separate activities from other 
sectors of the economy, whereas many services in fact are intricately bound to 
other sectors of the economy (Clancy 1998:127).  
Services are, in fact, fundamental to the functioning of value added chains. The more 
decentralised production chains get, the more transnational business networks emerge, 
and the more they rely on key infrastructure service sectors (ISS) to be liberalised, 
namely, telecommunication, transportation, financial and other services, such as en-
ergy and water. This insight has brought researchers and policymakers on the plan, 
who now mostly view the services sector as closely interwoven with trade in goods 
(cf. Adlung 2007). 
 
Services play a particularly important role for value added chains extending across 
borders. While long distances render logistics and communication more complex, ad-
ditional services are required to overcome the differences in local regulations and eco-
nomic environments. As noted by Apte and Mason (1995:1250): 
The activities that should be considered for globalising are those that are tradi-
tionally labelled as services (e.g. financial, transportation, professional) as 
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well as those that constitute the service component of a manufacturing process 
(e.g. product and process design, inbound-outbound logistics, management in-
formation systems, finance, accounting, marketing).  
Once these services are in place in the relevant region, cross-border value added 
chains stand much better chances for success than without a strong services sector. 
Clancy (1998:128) postulates that there is even a causal relationship between the glob-
alisation of services sectors and growth in trade, investment and other transnational 
alliances. 
 
Another aspect of importance for the availability and quality of services is the quality 
and reliability of infrastructure, including access to finance. Services and infrastructure 
are inherently linked with each other. For example, the pre-existence of an open land-
line phone wire network will dramatically reduce the sunk costs for incoming phone 
operators. Furthermore, it has been shown that liberalisation tends to reduce the cost 
and improves the quality of service provision (cf. Adlung 2007). Furthermore, liberal-
ising trade in services is expected to improve the quality of services, and to promote 
economic growth in the long run (cf. Adlung 2007, Australian Government 2004, 
Chaudhuri and Karmakar 2008). In emerging markets, both the provision of essential 
infrastructure and the liberalisation of trade in services are expected to have a dispro-
portionately strong positive impact on long run growth by indirectly promoting cross-
border value added chains and brain circulation (UNCTAD 2010b). 
 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, foreign-educated entrepreneurs’ decisions to 
return to their home countries depend on political stability, economic openness and the 
availability of resources and services required for successful business prospects. Thus, 
it is important for emerging markets to foster a local skill base, good governance, as 
well as to provide an infrastructure that is supportive of entrepreneurship. Further-
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more, institutional obstacles to entrepreneurship-led growth need to be removed (Sax-
enian 2006:110) and rigid labour laws reformed towards more entrepreneurial-friendly 
terms, even if core labour standards should be insisted upon, challenges to good gov-
ernance are one of the main difficulties which many developing countries are facing 
on this issue. Governments face pressure by domestic coalitions of informal business 
that feel threatened by transnational, expatriate-led entrepreneurship. Under such pres-
sure, especially developing country governments have indirectly discriminated against 
successful foreign or transnational businesses and have been treating the informal 
business sector more favourably for protectionist reasons (UNCTAD 2005:28-29; 
2009:42, 91).2  
 
There are a number of examples where the various obstacles to the development and 
growth of entrepreneurial ventures set up by expatriate returnees have been removed 
successfully. The following few paragraphs will look at the cases of Taiwan, China 
and India, which each have set up unilateral expatriate policies and the case of the 
France/Senegal and EU-African relations, as examples for bilateral/regional policy 
frameworks to foster transnational expatriate networks and entrepreneurship leading to 
cross-border added value chains. 
 
In Taiwan, active government recruitment and rapid economic growth helped to turn 
brain drain into brain circulation, with many US-educated engineers returning home. 
The upgrading of Taiwan’s technological infrastructure and capacities further spurred 
the reversal of the brain drain (Saxenian 2001:8). The elements of an attractive envi-
ronment for expatriates include a well-developed skill base and technical infrastruc-
                                                 
2 The informal economy in Africa is estimated to account for 42% of output in 1999–
2000, although reaching as high as 60% in some countries; see UNCTAD Economic 
Development in Africa Series, 'Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment’, 
2005, pp. 28-29. 
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ture, an attractive physical environment for entrepreneurs, and a growing venture capi-
tal industry. Once in place, the transnational community accelerated the pace of inno-
vation and industrial upgrading in Taiwan beyond the expectations of policymakers 
(Saxenian 2001:14-15). 
 
In China, the local and central governments pursued two types of strategy in attempts 
to reverse the perceived brain drain: (i) they devoted substantial resources to promot-
ing technical and business exchanges that involve overseas Chinese students, and (ii) 
they attempted to encourage students to come home with visits from representatives of 
ministries as well as of municipal governments. Furthermore, many local governments 
have established so-called ‘Returning Students Venture Parks’, which offer infrastruc-
ture and financial benefits, and address special needs of returnees, such as accelerating 
bureaucratic processes and high-quality schools for the returnees’ children. The so 
fostered transnational community particularly promoted a change in the region with 
formerly Taiwan-based companies moving specific parts of the process in their pro-
duction chain to China (Saxenian 2001:23-25). 
 
In the case of India, interviews with young Indian entrepreneurs who attempted to re-
turn to India in order to launch their own business showcase that the services sector is 
most crucial for young entrepreneurs: 
In India, expatriates complain about bureaucratic restrictions, corrupt and un-
responsive officials, and an infrastructure that causes daily frustrations – from 
unreliable power supplies, water shortages, and backward and costly tele-
communication facilities to dangerous and congested highways (Saxenian 
2001:19). 
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Finally, in the case of France, we can distinguish between an early and a later phase of 
mobilising expatriates to return or to engage in circular movement. A first policy in-
strument of varied success is France’s Foreign Ministry co-funding by up to 25% of 
the costs of the Diaspora-led projects to top up the efforts of migrants. France basi-
cally prioritises a credit line within the Framework Partnership Documents, the prior-
ity solidarity funds (PSF): the Framework Partnership Documents, which embed the 
PSF development aid programs, are signed with countries falling into the so-called 
priority solidarity zone encompassing former French colonies.  
 
Co-funding has been an increasingly popular tool for stimulating migrant entrepre-
neurship and transnational networks, and has been tested in a number of different 
forms. In the case of the ‘tres por uno’ scheme, a number of Mexican States, and thus 
the country of origin rather than the destination country of migrants, earmarks funding 
for returning migrant’s entrepreneurial projects in their home communities (COM 
2006 735:22). Another example is the German-Turkish programme running since 
1985, which operates a trilateral funding mechanism. Both Turkey and Germany co-
equally pay an annual 11 million Euros into a joint fund, which matches and bears up 
to 50% of the returning migrant’s investments projects’ estimated capital needs (Böh-
ning 1994:219-20). One advantage of co-funding is that it directly involves the Dias-
pora by circumvention of the government3. Another advantage of co-funding is that it 
can involve third-party financiers. For example, the French FSP co-development fund-
ing tool seeks matching funds by NGOs, international organisations, immigration as-
sociations, by local (source country) communities, the private sector and other gov-
                                                 
3 France-Diplomatie, available at : http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-
files_156/senegal_233/france-and-senegal_5382/framework-partnership-document-france-senegal-
2006-2010_8619.html. 
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ernments4. In the FSP Mali (2001) and the FSP Senegal (2005), 29% of the FSP Co-
development funds are financed by migrants (Groupe Agence Française de Dévelop-
pement 2006). The main disadvantage of co-funding is that it is still mostly financed 
through development aid5 and thus relies on government resources from tax revenue, 
rather than on private funding.  
 
A second way of stimulating expatriate entrepreneurship is embedded in France’s new 
pacts with migrant source countries, whereby France recruits the scientific and techni-
cal Diaspora elite for short-term expert missions in source countries, by creating joint 
university chairs. For instance, Articles 5, 6 and Annex II of France’s pact on con-
certed migration management with Senegal, seeks the voluntary returns of Senegalese 
medical doctors and other health professionals based in France by offering research 
equipment or the prospect of joint university appointments6. In addition, the new pacts 
establish circular migration schemes for professional education and punctual expert 
missions by members of the Diaspora (de Haas xx:70-1). Temporary labour migration 
is so put to use for developing the human capital and increasing the skill-base of 
source countries. 
 
A third type of government-led initiatives for stimulating expatriate entrepreneurship 
in their countries of origin is France’s offer of tax breaks on 40% of the total sum 
which a migrant saves between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2011. The funds 
                                                 
4 France-Diplomatie, available at : http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-france_830/aide-au-
developpement_1060/politique-francaise_3024/instruments-aide_2639/fonds-solidarite-prioritaire-
fsp_2640/index.html. 
5 In France, granted over renewable two-year periods by the French Parliament, in 2008 at a level of 30 
million Euros. France, Diplomatie, availablet at : http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/actions-
france_830/aide-au-developpement_1060/politique-francaise_3024/instruments-aide_2639/fonds-
solidarite-prioritaire-fsp_2640/index.html. See also: France, Ministry of Immigration, Integration, Na-
tional Identity and Solidarity Development, available at: 
http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_dev&numrubrique=216&numarticle=135
7. 
6 Sénat, Le Co-développement à l’essai, Travaux Parlementaires, Rapports d’information, http: 
www.senat.fr/rap. 
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destined for a project can go up to 25% of a migrants’ global revenue with an annual 
ceiling of EUR 20’000 (Decree no. 2007-218:3074). For example, a first agreement 
has been signed with the union of Tunisian banks in 2008 to encourage these to make 
available the co-development savings account7. After the minimal savings period of 
three years, the holder of the bank booklet who applies for a credit to finance invest-
ments in countries with which France has signed a new pacts on concerted migration 
management, will obtain the bonus. The type of investments that trigger the premium 
will be listed in the pacts (Decree no. 2008-613:Art. R221-117). Unlike co-funding, 
the tax reductions and bonuses involve the expatriate more closely. For this type of 
bilateral policy to be operational, however, the financial institutions of the country of 
origin must either sign an agreement with the country of destination (such as Tunisian 
banks have done) or the country of origin must have offered some degree of market 
access to foreign financial services supply either through its mode 1 GATS commit-
ments or have liberalised the establishment of commercial presence by foreign finan-
cial services institutions in its mode 3 GATS commitments.  
 
The EU has also sought to replicate France’s co-development plans, through the Rabat 
Action Plan. This plan encourages EU Member States to replicate the different types 
of agreements France had designed, such as those to ‘allow young professionals to 
perfect their linguistic and professional skills, as well as to gain a paid work experi-
ence in another country,’ and agreements defining measures to ensure the return of 
these migrants in their countries of origin at the end of their stay (Boswell 2003). In 
particular, the Rabat Action Plan aimed for student returns through a ‘seduction’ strat-
egy, whereby transnational research networks should be improved and regional centres 
of excellence should be established in the South. Minister Hortefeux, while presenting 
                                                 
7 France, Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Solidarity Development, available 
at: http://immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_det_dev&numrubrique=216&numarticle=1360. 
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the Pact to the European Parliament in July 2008 quite cautiously, advocated a two-
step process: only after presentation of ‘steadfast results providing a safe ground on 
which to build initiatives supportive of circular migration and knowledge transfer’ 
would the EC Council offer opportunities to workers and students willing to settle in 
Europe and take ‘co-development action to enable migrants to take part in the devel-
opment of their home countries’ (European Pact on Immigration and Asylum 2005).  
 
Senegal’s government has been successful in identifying the Senegalese living abroad 
and mobilising these to take on some responsibility for the development of their local 
communities. The Investment Promotion and Major Works Agency (APIX) founded 
in 2000 and immediately placed under the auspices of the President of the Senegalese 
Republic has played an important role in attracting private capital, including, through 
its ‘Entrepreneurship Diaspora’, the investments of Senegalese abroad in government-
initiated infrastructure projects8. APIX also invests loans made by foreign govern-
ments, such as those of France and Germany, to finance projects facilitating the eco-
nomic reintegration of return migrants. At least three different ministries have similar 
information campaigns in place for attracting investments by Senegalese abroad to 
Senegal and compete against each other for attracting investments by various sorts of 
information campaigns.  
 
As mentioned previously, predominantly lower-skilled Senegalese workers living in 
Northern Italian provinces have been instrumental in establishing joint ventures and 
partnerships between Italian food processing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
and Senegalese agricultural associations, namely in the dried tomato and biscuit indus-
tries. The ‘Caravane of SMEs in Italy’ initiated by the Ministry of Family, Womens’ 
                                                 
8 APIX, http://www.investinsenegal.com. 
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Entrepreneurship and Micro-finance of Senegal seeks to formalise those business con-
tacts and professional networks established by the Senegalese Diaspora in Italy 
through public-private partnerships. The success of such public-private partnerships 
will, among other factors, be determined by matching government initiatives in the 
services sector: Parma is proposing to receive charter flights by Air Sénégal Interna-
tional and to make available freezer storage spaces for storing tomatoes flown in from 
Senegal to have them dried in Italy9.  
 
Contributing to Diaspora-led capacity building in technical, vocational training and 
professional education are various co-development initiatives at the international level, 
such as UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), 
which was launched for Senegal in 2002 with US$ 200,00010. In 2003, Italy and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) launched two migration for develop-
ment programmes (MIDA) to promote links between hometown associations of immi-
grant local communities in Italy and local communities in Senegal, Ghana and Ethio-
pia and to facilitate entrepreneurship (and thus socioeconomic reintegration) of mi-
grants returning home (Gallina 2007). The project was reformulated as MIDA It-
aly/Senegal/Ghana and excluded Ethiopia11. One of its key operational measures is a 
database, where Senegalese residing abroad can register their interest in contributing 
to the development of their country of origin and list their skills (de Haas 2006:29). 
The UN Digital Diaspora Network (launched in 2002 and in 2003 for Africa) as a 
partnership of different UN sub-organisations, including the UN Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) task force and the United Nations Development 
                                                 
9 Senegal, Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, Womens’ Entrepreneurship and Microfinance, 
Caravane des PME en Italie, June 2006. 
10 Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals, available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.sn/maeuase/tokten_note_presentation.htm. 
11 IOM, MIDA Ghana- Senegal 2006/2007 Migration for Development in Africa, available at: 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/mida/MIDA_Gha_
Sen_4_Website_EN.pdf. 
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Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and seeks to promote development and the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals through mobilising the resources of Diaspora12. 
 
‘While policy-makers and planners can encourage cross-border connections, they can-
not create or substitute for transnational entrepreneurs and their decentralised net-
works’ (Saxenian 2006:110). As shown by this section, governments can, however, 
proactively assist private sector participation in cross-border value added chains. For 
example, they can assist producers to enter these chains or they can use policy instru-
ments, such as liberalising trade to reposition the corporate sector within value chains. 
Between 1998 and 2008, international trade in services has grown by 8% annually, 
outpacing world GDP growth of 5% (Fukui and McDaniels 2010:2). This fact offers 
additional weight to the argument that liberalising services trade is not only beneficial 
as a vehicle for cross-border entrepreneurial networks to better access complementary 
assets, such as physical infrastructure, financial intermediation, human resource rents, 
and trade policy rents (Kaplinsky 2000:32). Nor is it only important because of its 
spill-over effects for goods production. It can rather be regarded as an end in itself, 
also for developing countries ‘which are stand to gain from more services liberalisa-
tion’ (Fukui and McDaniels 2010:2-4). 
 
 
4. The GATS and Cross-Border Value Added Chains 
The previous section has shown that the requirements for stimulating the emergence of 
cross-border value added chains are manifold: high quality infrastructure services – 
notably transportation, communication, finance and business services – good govern-
ance in terms of the regulatory and institutional frameworks relating to these, but also 
                                                 
12 Kampala Declaration, Africa Launch of the Digital Diaspora Initiative 5–7 May 2003, Kampala 
Uganda, available at: http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/wsis/documents/KampalaDeclaration.pdf. 
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liberalising the cross-border flow for natural persons. Particularly the temporary 
movement of professionals, such as accountants, engineers and technicians, and other 
categories of service providing persons, is essential for fostering a functioning infra-
structure (UNCTAD 2010b:16).  
 
As Winters (2005:6) has argued, only if developing and least developed countries, are 
prepared to open more broadly and widely these services sectors to foreign competi-
tion, will it be possible to reverse brain drain by fostering an attractive business envi-
ronment accompanied by sound infrastructure and good governance, which is the pre-
condition to mobilise expatriates to return physically or to engage in FDI and other 
transnational entrepreneurial activities. One way to achieve this goal relatively fast, is 
through trade liberalisation in services, as this has proved to promote better quality 
services and allow for cross-border value added chains if liberalisation is regional or 
even global (Adlung 2007). 
 
The most obvious legal tool to achieve this goal would be the GATS, being the major 
global treaty for trade liberalisation in services, with 153 member-economies: 
Despite the official objective of promoting global trade liberalisation in services 
through the GATS, its impact has been limited since entering into force in 1995. Even 
though newer studies suggest that 50 percent reduction in barriers may lead to five 
times larger welfare gains than trade liberalisation in non services sectors (Robinson et 
al. 2002), trade in services is still far from being globally liberalised (cf. Hoekman 
2000). The following sub-sections will take a closer look at each of the key infrastruc-
ture-related services sectors identified above and their evolution under the GATS pro-
gressive liberalisation. 
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4.1 Trade Liberalisation in Transportation Services 
In the case of transportation services, the GATS de facto differentiates between air 
transport services, maritime transport services, rail transport services and road trans-
port services, all of which are relevant in the case of cross-border value added chains. 
In the air transport sector, traffic rights or services directly related to the exercise of 
traffic rights are excluded from liberalisation (Annex on Air Transport Services). Con-
sequently, no liberalisation is taking place in the air transport sector under the GATS 
(WTO Secretariat 2000:51-70).  
 
The maritime transport sector is fairly liberalised compared to other services sectors. 
For example, bulk traffic ‘faces no restrictions except in one or two countries’ (WTO 
Secretariat 2000:430), while liner traffic is organised in conferences (cartels fixing 
prices and frequencies) and more and more increasingly large independent operators. 
Most of the traffic between countries is regulated by a framework of bilateral inter-
governmental cargo-sharing agreements. Thus, even though maritime transport is inte-
grated in the GATS, the GATS did not add much to the general liberalisation of the 
sector and there are still many issues remaining unsolved in the maritime services sec-
tor, particularly in relation to supporting services for maritime transport (Dee 2005, 
WTO Secretariat 2000, Roy et al. 2007).  
 
In the case of rail transport services, the current grade of trade liberalisation needs to 
be analysed in the 4 modes of supply. Due to the historical background of rail trans-
portation as being state-owned, there used to be little to no competition in the sector 
until very recently. Therefore:  
In the case of mode 1, for a long time international transport of passengers and 
freight only consisted of joining successive national segments of transport. No 
single entity was responsible for an international journey, the freight or the 
 
24 
passenger being passed on from one monopolistic network to another (WTO 
Secretariat 2000:488). 
Beside political hindrances, many technical obstacles hamper trade liberalisation in 
mode 1, such as incompatibilities in braking systems, height of railway wagons, type 
of electric power, and so on. With regard to mode 2, there is no restrictive legislation 
anywhere, and cross-border cooperation among railway companies works generally 
well. As long as railway companies remain state-owned, no trade is possible under 
mode 3. And because rail transport as a sector is only very little privatised, and par-
ticularly not in emerging markets, mode 3 is almost irrelevant today. Finally, as for 
mode 4, ‘there is always a marginal flow of technicians and engineers, particularly to 
developing countries’. In conclusion, the level of commitments in rail transport ser-
vices appears low as a consequence of national monopolies (Findlay 2008, WTO Se-
cretariat 2000). 
 
Road transportation is a fairly large sector in services, with many difficulties in classi-
fying and defining the various services and confining them to the GATT (WTO Secre-
tariat 2000:501). In the case of passenger transportation, urban public transportation is 
generally less liberalised than interurban. However, overall, liberalisation of passenger 
transportation services on the road seems low. As far as freight transportation is con-
cerned, the degree of liberalisation depends on the type of goods transported: mail 
transportation, freight transportation by man- or animal-drawn vehicles and transporta-
tion of bulk liquids and gases are only to a small extent liberalised. Liberalisation is 
higher in the transportation services of the economically more significant goods, such 
as frozen goods, containers or furniture. However, the sector tends to be noticeably 
limited by the exclusion of cabotage from the commitments. Furthermore, derogations 
from MFN in cargo-sharing provisions are mainly bilateral or regional (WTO Secre-
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tariat 2000:521), ’they also remove a significant proportion of the traffic from 
the application of MFN and more generally from liberalisation’. While there 
have been several regional attempts to liberalise the road transport sector, such meas-
ures have not yet been targeted at the multilateral level (WTO Secretariat 2000, 
Findlay 2008). 
 
4.2 Trade Liberalisation in Telecommunication Services 
The telecommunication industry is in a process of rapid structural change while the 
national monopolies are suddenly facing competition and are being privatised in many 
countries. These changes in the sector are reflected in the GATS, particularly in the 
definition of the subsectors (GATS Services Sectoral Classification List 
MTN.GNS/W/120). The distinction between these subsectors has blurred already:  
[…] with the adoption of new transmission technologies, the enhanced ability 
to integrate different technologies, and the advent of service suppliers who 
distinguish themselves not by specialising in particular telecom services, but 
rather by the market segments they seek to serve (WTO Secretariat 2000:534). 
Because any list of classification of services in the telecommunication sector would 
quickly be out of date, categories of services have been developed during the negotia-
tions to bridge this gap. In terms of the extent of market access, commitments differ 
between the different categories and the different modes of supply. Value-added ser-
vices tend to be more liberalised than basic services. And industrialised countries gen-
erally have a more open telecommunication market than emerging countries (WTO 
Secretariat 2000:540). 
 
Although particularly cross-border and consumption abroad will gain in importance in 
the future due to new technologies, commercial presence will remain essential for ser-
vice suppliers. Consequently, emerging markets seem to follow a promising course of 
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policy in the case of trade liberalisation in telecommunication services. However, even 
though the telecommunication sector is generally fairly liberalised, three types of mar-
ket access limitations remain: (i) Limitations on the number of suppliers, (ii) restric-
tion on type of legal entity, and (iii) limitations on the participation of foreign capital. 
These limitations particularly affect the commercial presence, and emerging markets 
are more likely to maintain such limitations and to shape them more strictly (Dee 
2005, Cowhey and Aronson 2008, Adlung 2006). 
 
4.3 Trade Liberalisation in Financial Services 
Like telecommunication services, the financial services industry has seen revolution-
ary changes as a consequence of technological advances (WTO Secretariat 2000:338). 
Financial services are, thus, still evolving with every new technological innovation, 
and legal regulation is a difficult task. These technological advances render mode 1 
trade more and more common, but many types of financial services still require com-
mercial presence. Mode 1 and mode 3 supply are, thus, most interesting for liberalisa-
tion. In terms of the actual commitments under the GATS, mode 3 commitments are 
predominating, while mode 1 supply of financial services remains relatively restricted. 
Moreover, quite a few countries have taken MFN exemptions. 
 
The financial sector is among the most heavily regulated sectors of all services sectors. 
This is partly because the sector is of imminent importance for the growth perform-
ance of an economy, but also because there is a need for government intervention in 
the sector in order to prevent market failure. Liberalisation under the GATS, thus, 
aims at ‘endors[ing] the need for regulatory policies to correct perceived market fail-
ures and systemic externalities in the financial sector […] while enhancing competi-
tion’ (WTO Secretariat 2000, Roy et al. 2007, Hoekman and Mattoo 2007). Especially 
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emerging markets fear that liberalising in financial services will afford a competitive 
advantage to globally active MNCs and displace local banking and loan institutions. 
However, others have found that if developing countries were to liberalise trade in 
financial services, they could see gains of 300 billion USD by 2015 (Coalition of Ser-
vices Industries, Report, 2006). 
 
4.4 Trade Liberalisation in Professional Services 
Professional services are infrequent, technical, or unique functions performed by con-
tractors or consultants. They include legal services, architectural and engineering ser-
vices, accountancy services, and computer and related services. While industrialised 
countries tend to open their market in all these different sub-sectors, developing coun-
tries remain reluctant to liberalisation of professional services trade and have, with a 
few exceptions, undergone fewer commitments under the GATS (WTO Secretariat 
2000:32-3). The following gives a short overview of the general tendencies in trade 
liberalisation in professional services under the GATS. 
 
The professional services sector is generally fairly open for foreign market access. 
This is particularly true for the sub-sectors of accountancy, architectural, and engineer-
ing services, followed by legal services. In the case of accountancy services, the great-
est level of full market access is granted for mode 2. The sector is open to cross-border 
supply, too. However, only partial market access is granted in respect to modes 3 and 
4.  
 
Architectural and engineering services, accounting for the biggest share in liberalisa-
tion commitments under the GATS, have the greatest level of full market access in 
mode 3 and 4. Commercial presence and the presence of natural persons is crucial for 
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these kinds of services. Thus, architectural and engineering services compare favoura-
bly with other services sectors in mode 3 and 4 liberalisation. However, while full 
market access in mode 3 is granted by relatively many members, labour migration is 
always limited by horizontal measures.  
 
The extent of market access in the case of legal services varies from one specific kind 
of legal service to another. Generally, opening the legal services sector to trade is 
based on the principle of reciprocity, and, thus, often depending on preferential ar-
rangements among member states. However, it appears that: 
[…] in some specific commitments, the actual legal services regime is more 
liberal than the regime bound in the schedules and that some countries who 
have not scheduled specific commitments and have listed MFN exemptions 
maintain rather liberal legal services regimes (WTO Secretariat 2000:415-6). 
Computer and related services have merged from a number of other sectors and are a 
fast-growing and lucrative market. The industry has developed in an open and com-
petitive environment, which ‘is often credited with having driven its rapid growth’: 
As the industry has matured, however, some segments have shown a tendency 
to concentration in large companies. So while sector-specific regulation is 
nearly non-existent, competition authorities in some countries have had an in-
fluence on the development of the computer industry and related services 
(WTO Secretariat 2000:154).  
There are, thus, concerns that the traditionally unregulated computer services sector 
could begin to face similar constraints as the telecommunications services sector 
(WTO Secretariat 2000, Cowhey and Aronson 2008). 
 
In emerging markets, the presence of natural persons is particularly important in the 
computer services industry due to prevailing shortages of skilled labour. As a conse-
quence of these shortages, cross-border trade in computer services has become in-
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creasingly important, too, as employers seek to alleviate labour shortages by cross-
border relationships with foreign computer services suppliers. However, while cross-
border trade in computer services is very liberalised, commitments in mode 4 are low 
with most restrictions (WTO Secretariat 2000, Primo Braga 1996). 
 
4.5 Overall Adequacy of the GATS for Cross-Border Value Added Chains 
Generally, the GATS faces several constraints in trade liberalisation in services, 
mainly due to its multilateral nature. Several services sectors are still being negotiated, 
the different schedules of the member states differ greatly, and definitions in the com-
mitments are often outdated as the market evolves more quickly than negotiations pro-
gress. Furthermore, trade liberalisation in services is a very sensitive issue on the mul-
tilateral level, as services are directly linked to labour migration and technological 
development. Unlike the GATT, the GATS to date still lacks an adequate safeguard 
mechanisms for industrialised countries to protect their labour markets against a sud-
den influx of mode 4 workers, but also for emerging markets to keep out more ad-
vanced foreign services firms in telecommunications, banking in order to protect their 
infant industries (Sauvé 2008:617-620).  
 
A further challenge to non-diversified small and vulnerable economies, which happen 
to be mostly developing and least developed countries, is the fact that without com-
pensation in another sector or mode of supply (Art. XXI GATS), commitments cannot 
be modified. This fact may also dis-incentivise industrialised countries from offering 
access to their labour markets more broadly to foreign service providers (Panizzon 
2010a:28). Another key shortcoming is the GATS scheduling structure of commit-
ments. The latter is inadequately tailored for shifting any regulatory burden – such as 
quality control – upon the government of a labour sending country or the country 
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benefiting from market access for its ISS services. Neither is it possible to obtain a 
guarantee from any government that the physical person sent abroad will not overstay, 
but return in a timely and orderly fashion in full respect of the host country’s labour 
and immigration law.  
 
However, a WTO Member can require, as a qualification to national treatment (Art. 
XII), that the service provider, a physical person or a firm should respect minimum 
wage and other local labour laws, should employ a minimum of domestic workers, and 
should offer training possibilities to these, such as by setting up intra-corporate sub-
sidiary to headquarter transfers programmes). Therefore, the extent to which WTO 
Members have granted market access at the multilateral level is relatively modest, es-
pecially when measured against the great potential for economic growth – especially 
for emerging markets – that is expected from trade liberalisation in services.  
 
In the particular case of trade liberalisation in the services sectors relevant for cross-
border value added chains, the shortfalls of the GATS are the following: 
General: As the different schedules differ greatly, it is difficult for an entre-
preneur to understand his/her legal rights and duties when establishing a 
cross-border value added chain. Furthermore, in most cases, the degree of lib-
eralisation is relatively modest, which means that it is yet insufficient for 
many needs of cross-border production networks (cf. Whalley 2003:3-4). 
Transportation: Market access in the transportation sector is particularly re-
stricted due to state-owned railway-companies, non-existent liberalisation in 
the air transportation sector, and little and particularly multi-levelled – and 
therefore complicated – liberalisation in road transportation. Only the mari-
time transportation sector seems to meet the needs of cross-border entrepre-
neurial networks. Two kinds of transportation can be distinguished in a cross-
border value added chain: transports of finished goods to the consumer and 
transports of semi-finished goods from one location of value addition to the 
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next. In most cases, the latter will be much more important, although this de-
pends on the length and scope of each individual value added chain. There are 
no particular regulations concerning such transportation of semi-finished 
goods as part of a cross-border value added chain.  
Telecommunication: Telecommunication services are at the heart of cross-
border value added chains. This is because without communication the proc-
essing of a product in different regions at different stages would be unthink-
able and unmanageable. The main problem in this sector is the lack of ade-
quate definitions of the specific telecommunication services, without general 
liberalisation. Furthermore, particularly emerging markets seem reluctant to 
liberalise their telecommunication sectors under the GATS. While the market 
is fairly open to mode 1 market access, the underdevelopment of infrastruc-
ture in emerging markets tends to act as an almost insurmountable de-facto 
market entry barrier. In view of this reality, only competitive pressures in 
mode 3 commercial presence could make a real difference for cross-border 
entrepreneurial networks. In the longer run, improving the quality and reliabil-
ity of infrastructure could potentially have a similar effect. 
Financial Services: For cross-border value added chains, particularly mode 1 
supply is relevant. However, there is only little liberalisation in mode 1 under 
the GATS. 
Professional Services: Here, the GATS already provides a good starting point 
for further liberalisation. Main difficulty in this sector is, however, that nego-
tiations are still ongoing, with open ending and leaving quite some legal un-
certainty in the meantime. Interestingly, emerging markets tend to be more re-
luctant in opening their professional services sectors, than industrialised coun-
tries. Thus, particularly in the case of cross-border value added chains in 
emerging markets, there’s still a great potential to be tapped. 
Labour Migration / Mode 4: For the creation and development of cross-
border value added chains that are based on the international networks of en-
trepreneurs, labour migration is a key to success. This is because taking ad-
vantage of the cross-border networks requires the possibility to work with the 
best people with the most appropriate skills at the right place in the process of 
the value added chain. These networks tend to consist of highly educated peo-
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ple, which often provide their know-how under consultancy rather than em-
ployment contracts. Thus, they often fall into the services providers group, de-
spite having to move to the place of production.  
Restrictions in mode 4, thus, may hamper the creation of cross-border value 
added chains, or even render such business ideas impossible to realise. Again, 
due to its multilateral nature, trade liberalisation in mode 4 is very restricted 
under the GATS and does not meet the needs of cross-border entrepreneurial 
networks. 
 
4.6 RTAs and the Potential of Compensating for the Shortfalls of the GATS 
Trade liberalisation in services is generally easier to negotiate the larger the expected 
gains from liberalisation are for both negotiating partners. Moreover, trade liberalisa-
tion in services requires less definition and regulation if the negotiating partners have 
similarly structured services sectors (cf. Agu 2009). Finally, trade liberalisation in ser-
vices is most promising among countries that share a similar culture, language, and 
level of development (cf. Sturgeon 2000:3). Thus, it is worthwhile to consider RTAs 
as a way of compensating the shortfalls of the GATS with respect to stimulating the 
creation of cross-border value added chains. 
 
Beside the opportunity to fully open the services market through RTAs, and therewith 
compensate for the shortfalls of the GATS, RTAs could also provide a vehicle to ne-
gotiate specific conditions for the creation of cross-border value added chains. Sup-
porting and promoting value added chains in such a way has the potential of fostering 
economic growth in the entire region participating in the RTA. This could be expected 
to alleviate distributional issues in negotiations. Thus, even if the complete liberalisa-
tion of trade in services remains non-negotiable, providing the required access to ser-
vices for cross-border entrepreneurs might still be worthwhile for both negotiating 
partners.  
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RTAs with their propensity to being closer to shared (business) culture, educational 
and professional curricula and language have an advantage over GATS particularly 
where sectors and modes of supply are concerned, as these require harmonised quality 
standards or mutual recognition of qualification. Furthermore, RTAs are better 
equipped than GATS when it comes to ‘promoting the effectiveness of regulatory ag-
encies, including assistance provided by developed countries’ (UNCTAD 2010b:15). 
As regards ISS, transnational regulatory cooperation and institution-building are es-
sential, particularly when provided via modes 1 and 3. This holds especially true for 
finance, but also for preventing brain waste by ensuring that a non-national gets ac-
credited to deliver services in another country at his/her level of qualifications,. As 
UNCTAD (2010b:15) suggested, such exchanges are better done at a regional level 
and South-South twinning or exchange programmes could prove particularly helpful, 
but peer reviews among regulators within the same region could also serve to improve 
the quality and capacity of national regulation. 
 
However, RTAs may not always be the best vehicle for trade liberalisation in services 
with respect to cross-border value added chains. A distinction might be made between 
service sectors with regional and international supply structures. For example, air 
transportation services are almost by definition global, and possibly, liberalisation is 
generally more sustainable at the multilateral level. In contrast, rail transportation 
might recommend itself for regional liberalisation. Also, with every preferential free 
trade agreement, MFN and other restrictions under the GATS have to be considered, 
in order not to violate WTO law. 
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5. The Temporary Movement of Natural Persons under GATS Mode 
4 and FTAs and Transnational Value-Added Chains 
Facilitated and liberalised flows of labour movement are an essential pre-condition for 
transnational entrepreneurship and value-added chains to emerge. Beyond remittances 
transfers, the employment, studies or entrepreneurial activity abroad or a combination 
of these factors, has also ‘indirect trade-inducing effects’ for the country of origin 
(WTO Secretariat 2009:15)13. Thus, the temporary movement of natural persons holds 
more directly than liberalised trade in ISS a ‘development dividend’ for emerging mar-
kets.  
 
As noted, the level of GATS mode 4 commitments is shallow. While most developing 
and least developed countries are de facto excluded from mutual recognition agree-
ments, to the effect that even if labour markets were open to their nationals, these per-
sons would either fail to be admitted or would have to content themselves with occu-
pations below their skill levels (brain waste) (Chanda 2004:12-14). Whereas industri-
alised countries have liberalised market access in the categories of highly-skilled 
workers, the GATS lacks the guarantees that such temporary movement becomes per-
manent migration, which is a particular risk for what is commonly called ‘expatriates’. 
None of the industrialised countries’ schedule of GATS commitments contains any-
thing close to a return obligation, which the company employing a non-national would 
have to enforce.  
 
In this sense, the recently concluded EPA between Japan and the Philippines breaks 
new ground for all trade agreements as it is considered to be the first one to call on the 
                                                 
13 The WTO Secretariat notes the example of how the „presence of temporary Indian workers in the US 
has helped raise the awareness of the pool of skills available within India, thus increasing US compa-
nies’ inclination to deal with Indian workers and facilitating the eventual outsourcing of work to India’ 
(p. 15). 
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Filipino government (not companies) to ensure the timely and orderly return of the 
nurses and caregivers employed by Japanese health care facilities in Japan. Article 11 
of the Implementing Agreement to the JPEPA lays down a mandatory regulatory obli-
gation addressing the government of the Philippines to set up rules and regulations, 
including on the issuance of travel documents for ensuring immediate return to the 
Philippines of nurses and caregivers, who are required to leave Japan under Japanese 
immigration laws and regulations. Interestingly, this regulatory source country man-
date to ensure timely and orderly return is limited to nurses and caregivers and does 
not exist for the other categories of service providing Filipino nationals (Panizzon 
2010b:22). 
 
While emerging markets rely on human capital transfers by their expatriates abroad, 
the structure of the GATS does little to mobilise brain circulation. Moreover, it does 
not prescribe, for instance, multilateral adherence to an international ethical code of 
recruitment, which would prevent brain drain in the first place, nor do any of the WTO 
Members’ schedules of commitments require such guarantees.  
In addition, for GATS both the at-the-border-barriers (AtB) and the behind-the-border-
barriers (BtB) are considerable. In the case of the first, the immigration law caveat of 
the Annex on the Temporary Movement of Natural Person (Annex MONP), which 
forms part of the GATS excludes from the scope of GATS and thus from disciplines 
such as transparency (Art. III), MFN (Art. I), domestic regulation (Art. IV) all immi-
gration law barriers. This may include visa requirements, visa procedures, border secu-
ritisation programmes etc, unless, in the case of the visa requirements only, the pre-
scriptions are so burdensome that the value of a GATS commitment is nullified or 
impaired (footnote 13 to Annex MONP). In addition, most WTO Members limit mar-
ket access by operating extensive authorisation requirements for admission to work, 
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economic need tests, pre-employment requirements and quotas in their Schedules. 
These AtBs are, thus, narrowing down sensibly the GATS as a tool for facilitating 
circular, short-term labour migration in services.  
 
Despite paragraph 3 of the Annex MONP encouraging WTO Members to offer com-
mitments across the entire spectrum of occupations and skill categories, most WTO 
Members have kept their openings to the highly skilled or, if not formally trained, to 
persons equipped with special talents. Together with the fact that persons seeking ac-
cess to the employment market of another WTO Member fall outside the scope of 
GATS (as per paragraph 2 of the Annex MONP), the high-skill bias of GATS fails to 
provide for the emergence of entrepreneurial networks among lower-skilled migrants. 
This is a waste in economic potential as shows the well-documented example of sea-
sonal workers from Ghana, who established ties between their employers in Northern 
Italy with pineapple farmers in Ghana, eventually leading to the establishment of 
Ghanacoop, a blossoming import firm for pineapples to Italy (IOM Geneva, The 
MIDA Experience and Beyond 2009).  
 
Among service provider categories, the one of graduate trainees holds the most poten-
tial for promoting transnational expatriate networks, brain circulation and cross-border 
value added chains to emerge. WTO Members tend to be politically ready to liberalise 
the movement of the more highly skilled service providers within the WTOs multilat-
eral trading regime. Yet, the fact that but few WTO Members have in fact liberalised 
in the categories of graduate trainees sensibly diminishes the potential that GATS 
could play as a tool to foster such networks.  
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The element of ‘exchange’ inherent in the notion of a trainee refers to a reciprocal 
learning experience, implying that such persons not only supply (usually education), 
but also consume services (training). Graduate trainees thus combine elements of a 
mode 4-type movement with a mode 2-type service supply. Under the narrow defini-
tion of Art. 1:2 GATS, graduate trainees cannot be considered fully-fledged service 
suppliers because they often work only part-time and receive training during the rest 
of their time. Consequently, they cannot be considered ‘like’ other service supplying 
natural persons, working full-time and without an educational/training link (Nielson 
and Cattaneo 2003:139). Instead, they constitute a category of service providers of 
their own and could be labelled ‘quasi’-service supplying natural persons. Because 
graduate trainees, do not fall entirely under the definition of service suppliers of Art. 
I:2(d) GATS their temporary movement abroad should not only be liberalised in 
GATS mode 4 and its replicas, such as free trade and economic partnership agree-
ments, but also in bilateral, non-trade agreements, such as special ‘stagiaire or trainee-
ship exchange’ agreements.  
 
Among the different service supplier categories, which WTO Members are using, 
those categories of workers most likely to make a long-term physical or virtual return 
to their home country, are graduate trainees, followed by contractual service suppliers, 
CSS. As regards shorter-term financial returns to their country of origin, CSS top the 
list: Firstly, being ‘borrowed’ to a foreign firm abroad, their tax base remains their 
country of origin. Secondly, being sent abroad, but remaining employed and remuner-
ated by their employer and under jurisdiction of their source country (Mamdouh 
2008), the likelihood of their return home is higher than for other service providers.  
 
 
38 
In this context, the term ‘body shopping’ has come up (Biao 2008). Indian IT workers 
usually use this model for dispatching IT experts to European or US-American firm. 
Business sellers, which move abroad to set up a commercial presence or to negotiate a 
services contract with a would-be host country services consumer, are also likely to 
return back home, because like CSS, they do not receive remuneration from a source 
based in the host country (Carzaniga 2003:22-24). Unlike CSS, they return home 
without much added-value for their home country, since business sellers are even less 
exposed than CSS to the host country working environment, given that they do not 
provide a service. Also, their remittances transfers remain low nor will they be suffi-
ciently long abroad to establish expatriate networks.  
 
With independent professionals, the situation is somewhat different, since they are 
most likely to stay for a longer time abroad, remit less and, if they have a booming 
business in the country of destination without joint-ventures or otherwise de-linked 
from their home country they are less likely to re-engage with their home community.  
 
Unlike these three categories, graduate trainees are at high risk of staying on in their 
country of destination, especially if the host country legislation provides for a ‘first 
professional experience abroad’ admission card or permit of stay, such as France un-
der its bilateral pacts on concerted migration management (Decree of 26 August 2009) 
or Switzerland under Art. 30 of the Federal Law on Foreigners of 1 January 2008. 
Graduate trainees offer the ideal combination of young and skilled workers with opti-
mal integration capacity in the host country, all while being less likely to raise family 
reunification challenges, which usually complicate the admission procedures. Conse-
quently, graduate trainees are becoming a much sought after category of foreigners by 
industrialised countries competing against each other in the ‘global hunt for talent’ 
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(Kapur et al. 2005). For instance, France, beyond foreseeing a special admission card 
for graduate trainees under Article L313-7-1 of its new immigration law of 24 July 
2006, operates special bilateral agreements on young professionals (e.g. with Senegal 
which offers to put enterprises and employers in France in touch with young profes-
sionals seeking work in France).  
 
The paradox is that graduate trainees not only are the most sought-after category of 
foreign employment by host country firms, but they offer the highest potential in terms 
of developmental gains to their home country compared to other service provider cate-
gories. This is because, in addition to supplying a service abroad (mode 4), graduate 
trainees have also consumed (mode 2) services abroad and thus have aggrandised their 
skill base and know how abroad, which they can transfer either by physical or virtual 
return back home.  
 
The crucial policy issue then becomes the one of designing the most optimal return 
scheme for graduate trainees: which are the factors incentivising graduate trainees to 
re-engage with their home country, either virtually through investments-at-a-distance 
or by returning to home physically. Past experience has shown that institutional, desti-
nation-country-led initiatives, such as France’s training-for-return programmes em-
bedded in bilateral agreements on vocational and professional training for Senegalese 
and Algerian migrants wishing to return to a job in Senegal or Algeria14, failed to pro-
duce the desired effect, because there was no concrete employment opportunity lined 
up for these workers back in their home country. France undertook a new effort to 
                                                 
14 Agreement on training for workers who have temporarily emigrated to France with a view to their 
return to Senegal and their integration into the Senegalese economy, signed at Dakar on 1 December 
1980, came into force on 1 August 1982, UNTS Volume 1306, I-21788. In 1980, France and Senegal 
had already concluded an agreement on what today would be called ‘voluntary return’ (Agreement on 
training for workers who have temporarily emigrated to France with a view to their return to Senegal 
and their integration into the Senegalese economy). It provided for French government support to the 
professional development of Senegalese in France to prepare them for their return to Senegal. 
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encourage foreign students to return back home, by establishing, for instance in Dakar, 
a Centre for Studying in France, which operates a website that will inform Senegalese 
students in France about job offers in Senegal.  
 
Initiatives such as this one, are less motivated by a concern to contribute to source 
country human capital development and reversing the brain drain, but rather to prevent 
foreign students from overstaying their visas and remaining in unlawful stay often 
coupled with an unauthorised employment in France (Decree of 26 August 2009). The 
mixed success and duplicity of political motivations associated with host country gov-
ernment initiatives highlights once more the original argument of this paper, which is 
that for networks to emerge, it is essential that suitable infrastructure and career oppor-
tunities are available to expatriates in their home countries (WTO 2009:15).  
 
As mentioned, only but few members have liberalised the temporary movement of 
graduate trainees in their GATS schedules of commitments. With the Hong Kong Dec-
laration of 18 December 2005 stressing that ‘in the services negotiations, Members 
shall give priority to the sectors and modes of supply of export interest to LDCs, par-
ticularly with regard to movement of service providers under mode 4’ and the Services 
Signalling Conference of 26 July 2008 expressing the ‘readiness to improve access 
conditions for mode 4’, which according to Lamy are ‘expressly linked to the devel-
opment character of this Round’ (WTO 2008:8), it seems like the mode 4 agenda 
could be moving forward in the negotiations. For the time being, it is in free trade 
agreements and economic partnership agreements that most advances for liberalising 
the temporary movement of graduate trainees were made.  
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For instance, in the EC-CARIFORUM EPA, where the EU liberalised 29 sectors for 
Caribbean CSS and 11 sectors for temporary entry by Cariforum independent profes-
sionals or self employed persons, which is incidentally the widest commitment the EU 
has ever made in mode 4-type categories of non-nationals (ITUC Analytical Note: 
2008). Furthermore, the opening the EU has granted to graduate trainees in the EC-
CARIFORUM EPA corresponds to the one in the EC-27 Doha offer, but expands on 
the ‘direction’ of movement. Precisely regarding the aspect of the direction of move-
ment is the key factor for stimulating entrepreneurial networks and know-ledge trans-
fer back home. The EPA widens the scale of movement open to a graduate trainee 
from a CARIFORUM country, to that from a company’s subsidiary, usually in a 
CARIFORUM country to the firm’s headquarters (in Europe)15. This additional type 
of movement is the only one offering skill-upgrading possibilities to graduate trainees 
from CARIFORUM countries. The definition used implies that a domestic employer 
domiciled in the EU will recruit graduate trainees from the CARIFORUM countries, 
as opposed to a foreign firm, and is likely to fall outside the scope of GATS. Conse-
quently, the EC is under no obligation to generalise this opening preferentially granted 
only to CARIFORUM countries, to all WTO Members on the basis of the MFN clause 
of GATS (Sauvé and Ward 2009:17-19). 
 
Graduate trainees, students or professional exchanges or stagiaire programmes were a 
traditional domain of the first-generation bilateral migration agreements, concluded in 
the context of capacity-building and technical transfer with developing countries. Dat-
ing back to the 1950s when colonies gained independence from their motherlands, 
their rationale was to compensate for free circulation of persons lost to agreements 
introducing visa and work permit requirements towards the former colonies. In the 
                                                 
15 Art. 80 para. 2 lit. b CARIFORUM–EC EPA. 
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ongoing Doha Round of negotiations, the EC-27 has made in ‘nearly all sectors’, ‘a 
significant offer on graduate trainees who can move as intra-corporate transferees on 
management training programmes’.  
 
The EC-27 offer responds to the critique voiced by least-developed countries specifi-
cally, that industrialised countries have failed to offer commitments that are ‘meaning-
ful’ to LDCs (WTO Hong Kong Declaration, 2005). Thus, it explicitly advertises its 
offer as a ‘development tool’, which ‘can be used to provide for technology or know-
how transfer for newly qualified managers in LDCs’ (WTO 2005:2). In return, the EC 
pointed out that LDCs would need to make commitments in a ‘list of sectors focused 
on key infrastructure services, which can make an important contribution to develop-
ment’ (WTO 2005:4).  
 
As Rsyzard Cholewinksi has said ‘labour migration lies at the heart of migration man-
agement today’ (Cholewinski 2008:286). While labour migration can ‘accelerate’ de-
velopment in migrant source countries, it has the paradoxical effect, when left unregu-
lated, to deplete the human resources of migrant source countries (Martin and Abella 
2009). Numerous case studies have shown how labour recruitment policies of host 
countries and via mode 4 of GATS, have put at risk the supply and quality of essential 
services in vital sectors of education and health in source countries. Inconsistent trade 
liberalisation, migration and development policies can set source countries back eco-
nomically and financially, since importing foreign workers to do the job is costly and 
tax revenue lost can only partially be compensated by remittances transfers. Today 
Africa only has 20’000 scientists and engineers in population totalling 600 million 
(Terrot 2009:12). Sub-Saharan Africa is most affected by the migration of skilled 
workers, with over 20% of the tertiary-educated population living in OECD countries 
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and in some small countries the outflow reaching up to 80% (OECD 2006). For these 
reasons, liberalisation of trade in services strikes a win-win-win solution, whereby 
both migrant networks are fostered just as transfers of knowledge and entrepreneur-
ship are stimulated. 
 
 
6. A Legal Framework for Cross-border Networks: The Case of 
Jordan 
According to the previously elaborated preconditions for the creation and advancing of 
cross-border value added chains, the legal framework ought to have the following 
characteristics: 
– Trade in services should be liberalised with neighbouring countries or easily 
accessible regions, particularly in the services sectors of telecommunication, 
transportation, finance, and professional services. 
– With the same trading partners, trade in semi-finished goods should be freed 
from any kind of transaction costs. 
– For the establishment of a market for the value added product, the trading part-
ners should also have bilateral or multilateral trade agreements in goods with 
Western countries. 
– Finally, the trading partners should include labour migration regulations in the 
trade agreement and pursue a liberal practice in mode 4 supply. Particular 
weight should be put on labour migration of graduate trainees, students and 
professional exchanges. 
 
We neither did have the time nor the means to conduct an in-depth analysis of the cur-
rent legal framework in emerging markets. However, as a case of illustration, we 
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would like to draw the attention to certain particular aspects of the legal framework of 
Jordan. However, due to unexpected time constraints, this case-study will be presented 
at the conference and added to the paper later. The following few paragraphs are only 
meant to provide for a first impression of the idea. 
 
Jordan has consistently pursued liberal economic policies over the past thirty years. 
Alongside liberalisation within the country, Jordan has negotiated more than 45 bilat-
eral trade agreements and several Free Trade Agreements (FTA), as well as it has be-
come member of the WTO. Thus, Jordan’s economy is both internally, regionally and 
internationally well positioned for the creation and stimulation of cross-border value 
added chains. 
 
Most of Jordan’s bilateral trade agreements are non-preferential, aiming at discussing 
further ways to enhance economic cooperation. Therefore, they are not of any further 
interest in this context. However, Jordan’s FTAs (within the region, with the European 
Union, with the U.S., with Canada, and with Turkey) are relevant in the case of cross-
border value added chains and will be discussed here (cf. Jordanian Ministry of Indus-
try and Trade). 
 
6.1 Economic Integration in the Arab World 
Scholars seem more or less to univocally agree that economic integration in the Arab 
world is generally low, hampered mainly by weak implementation of international 
trade agreements. Particularly interesting is, therefore, a survey on cross-border trade 
in the Arab world conducted with representative numbers of cross-border entrepre-
neurs. Asked, whether or not the obstacles to cross-border trade have decreased in the 
past few years, they agreed that particularly in Egypt and Jordan the situation is better 
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now (Zarrouk 2003:54). As for the international trade agreements, GAFTA was men-
tioned as the most beneficial, followed by the WTO agreements.  
 
However, half of the respondents have not benefited from any trade agreement signed 
by their government. Among others, the reasons of not benefiting from trade agree-
ments are a lack of implementation and the fact that the agreements did not reduce the 
administrative procedures and paperwork. Furthermore, cross-border entrepreneurs in 
the Arab World mentioned inadequate transportation as a major hindrance to cross-
border trade (Zarrouk 2003:57-8). Thus, trading costs could be effectively reduced 
through regional free trade agreements that eliminate redundant procedures and cross-
border transportation restrictions (Zarrouk 2003:58). 
 
6.2 Regional Trade Liberalisation in Services and Semi-Finished Goods 
The GAFTA would be most beneficial to cross-border value added chains, as it ex-
empts semi-finished goods from customs duties and other taxes (Art. VI 3), and grants 
special concession for services associated with trade among the partners (Art. II 2, 4). 
However, it is well known that the GAFTA is badly implemented, and, thus, its effect 
on trade is small. 
 
In the attempt to push forward the stalled GAFTA, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tuni-
sia signed the AGADIR agreement. Even though the AGADIR agreement is not stat-
ing any further commitments than the GATS so far, it is aiming particularly at trade 
liberalisation in services. So far, trade liberalisation in services among the member 
states of AGADIR has, however, not been much affected (Momani 2007:8-9). This 
might also be the consequence of the fact that AGADIR does not exceed the level of 
liberalisation already committed in the GATS (Art. 5). 
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Jordan is, however, aware of the need for regional economic integration, particularly 
in the services sector. This can be seen in various paragraphs in bilateral trade agree-
ments in the region (stating the intention to open the services market), and in the offi-
cial statements of trade policy. E.g.: 
[…] it should be noted that the private sector stresses the need to develop a 
program to facilitate trade and improve logistic services, transport and ports, 
as well as facilitating the granting of visas for businessmen in Agadir coun-
tries. This is an important factor in encouraging cooperation among member 
states in the fields of transport and provision in order to reduce shipping cost 
and promote professional cooperation in the sector in [the] Agadir area (Quat-
tous and McCallin 2009:142). 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Jordan has a number of joint transportation 
companies with Syria and other Arab countries. These companies provide road trans-
portation for all kinds of goods among Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, sea transportation 
of goods between Syria and Western Europe, and maritime transportation of passen-
gers, goods and vehicles between Arab countries and Africa and Asia (Jordanian Min-
istry of Transport). 
 
Jordan has recently signed a partnership agreement with Turkey to set up a joint free 
trade zone. The agreement is facilitating travel and trade between the two countries 
through customs cooperation and the cancellation of visa fees. Furthermore, it should 
particularly allow for Turkish and Jordanian businessmen to establish new business 
ventures and join investments (Jordan Times 02 Dec 200916). 
 
                                                 
16 Available at: 
http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidZAWYA20091202072252/Jordan,%20Turkey%20sign%20FTA/ 
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6.3 Market Access in Developed Countries 
The recently negotiated FTA with Singapore is generally adhering to the commitments 
of the GATS. However, it does extend liberalisation in trade in services to the mutual 
recognition of certificates, and provides for an option of further liberalisation in the 
telecommunications sector. Furthermore, it creates a framework for financial services 
between Jordan and Singapore, and encourages transportation firms to cooperate 
(Chapter 4). The FTAs with the EU, US and Canada, will be described. 
 
6.4 Liberal Migration Regulations 
 
7. Conclusion 
Starting from the recent literature that identifies potential for economic development 
for emerging markets in cross-border value added chains, based on the networks of 
expatriates, this paper has analysed the legal framework for cross-border business ven-
tures in the developing world. Four key ISS sectors, telecommunication, transport, 
professional and financial services are identified as catalysts for cross-border value 
added chains. Liberalisation in these four key sectors on a regional level, therewith 
going beyond the current level of liberalisation of the GATS, is argued to provide for a 
more conducive and welcoming environment for cross-border entrepreneurs and help-
ing to prevent brain drain. Furthermore, liberal labour migration policies, including 
mode 4 supply are the necessary pre-condition for expatriate cross-border networks to 
emerge, both among highly-skilled professionals and non-formally trained migrant 
workers. We find that while host country governments have experimented with vari-
ous forms of stimulating expatriate investment and entrepreneurship involving their 
countries of origin, notably through tax incentives, co-funding, capacity-building in 
the context of unilateral immigration and development policies or bilateral non-trade, 
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migration agreements, these incentives, which are mostly managed by the executive 
branch of host country government are inherently limited by domestic worker coali-
tions, which may be negatively pre-disposed to government-funded promotion of ex-
patriate entrepreneurship. For these political economic constraints, we find that ser-
vices trade liberalization in ISS, but also for labor migration is the more optimal ave-
nue to mobilize migrants’ transnational business activities, which may occur in either 
of the three modes or a mix of these: thru entrepreneurship by physical return into 
their country of origin, investment-at-distance into host-country government co-
sponsored infrastructure, entrepreneurship or other development projects or into pri-
vately established projects and finally through the migrant acting as catalyst or broker 
of joint ventures between a host country and source country firm. 
 
We come to the conclusion that the current global legal framework is inappropriate for 
the stimulation of cross-border value added chains in the developing world, particu-
larly in the case of trade in services including the mode 4 of service supply through the 
temporary movement of natural persons abroad and liberal labour migration policies 
more generally. Thus, we suggest to adapt the legal framework on a regional level to 
the needs of cross-border entrepreneurs, and to address the issue of labour migration in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, particularly with Western economies. Finally, 
global trade liberalisation in services, including in mode 4 supply, would support 
emerging markets to a large extent in tapping the potential lying in their expatriate 
networks. 
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